Poor households in low-income countries face numerous risks, from extreme weather events to illness and crop failure. With limited savings and assets, even small shocks can have devastating consequences on welfare. While formal insurance products can potentially help mitigate these risks, their uptake remains remarkably low among rural smallholder farmers, who instead primarily rely on informal risk-sharing networks. This pattern persists despite evidence suggesting that informal insurance mechanisms provide incomplete coverage against shocks. These shocks translate into shortfalls in income and consumption (Karlan et al. 2014, Morduch 1999).
Studying the impact of insurance on farmers’ economic behaviour
In Nanyiti and Pamuk (2025), we focus on smallholder farmers in rural Uganda and examine how different insurance arrangements affect their economic behaviour and decision-making. Uganda provides an ideal setting to explore these questions, as only 1% of adults have formal insurance coverage, despite 67% of households depending on agriculture for their livelihoods. By comparing behaviour under formal insurance (provided by registered companies) versus informal insurance (peer-to-peer transfers), we gain insights into why formal insurance uptake remains low and how farmers respond to different risk management options.
Using a real effort task experiment, we investigate whether the incentives created by these different insurance arrangements influence productivity and risk management decisions. Our findings reveal important behavioural responses that help explain observed patterns in insurance uptake and suggest potential approaches for improving the design and adoption of formal insurance products. We find that farmers exerted less effort under informal insurance but not under formal insurance coverage, and increased their level of formal insurance coverage after experiencing a bad outcome.
By Dr. Aisha Nanyiti is a Lecturer at the School of Economics, College of Business and Management Sciences, Makerere University